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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Thomas LaMar Dewsnup, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, Case No. 14408 
vs. 
Bailey's Moving and Storage 
Company, a corporation, and 
Allied Van Lines, a corporation, 
Defendants and 
Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT BAILEY'S MOVING AND STORAGE COMPANY 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages for 
personal injuries sustained in a tractor and semi-trailer roll-
over accident. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a split Special Verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff in the sum of $329,364.31, of which $250,000.00 was 
awarded as general damages (R. 1000-1003). The general damage 
award exceeded the amount prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint by 
$50,000.00 (R. 675-681) and the trial court reduced the general 
damage award to $200,000.00 and entered judgment in the total sum 
of $279,364.31, but retained jurisdiction of the matter until it 
ruled on whether plaintiff was entitled to the $50,000.00 general 
-1-
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damages awarded in excess of the amount prayed for in his com-
plaint (R. 107). The trial court subsequently ruled in favor 
of plaintiff and entered an Order Amending Judgment on the 
Verdict which increased the judgment to a total of $329f364.31 
(R. 1075). The trial court also entered judgments in favor of 
defendant Allied Van Lines on its cross-claim against defendant 
Bailey1s Moving and Storage Company in the same amounts as 
awarded in favor of plaintiff against both defendants. 
The motion of defendants Bailey's Moving and Storage Company 
and Allied Van Lines for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or 
in the alternative for a new trial which raised the issues of 
excessive damages, insufficiency of the testimony of plaintiff's 
expert and of errors in law committed by the trial court (R. 1014-
1015) was denied (R. 1072). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company seeks reversal 
of the judgments awarded against it in favor of the plaintiff and 
cross-claimant Allied Van Lines on the ground that plaintiff's 
evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff, and consequently the judgment over against 
it in favor of the cross-claimant Allied Van Lines; or in the 
alternative for a new trial on the grounds that the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in receiving certain evidence as 
more specifically set forth hereinafter; or in the alternative 
that the judgments in question be modified to award no more 
general damages than prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(Recited most favorably to plaintiff) 
The plaintiff was employed in March, 1967 (Abs. 24) as a 
lease-operator driver by defendant Baileyfs Moving and Storage 
Company, a local agent of defendant Allied Van Lines. He was 
the owner and. operator of a 1967 Peterbilt tractor which was 
leased to defendant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company and 
used to pull a 1967 forty-foot Electronics Van semi-trailer, 
which was leased to defendant Bailey's Moving and Storage Com-
pany by C & J Bailey, a partnership. Plaintiff operated this 
combination rig for approximately seventeen months (Abs. 20) 
traveling in excess of 100,000 miles (Abs. 23) before the acci-
dent in question occurred on August 3, 1968. 
In the fall of 1967, plaintiff noticed a rattle which had 
developed in the rear end of the trailer and "cupping" wear on 
the trailer tires (Abs. 20). In the summer of 1968 when he was 
in Sacramento, California, another driver told him his rear end 
suspension was loose and he then noticed that the front torsion 
bar was "sloppy" (Abs. 20). 
When he returned to Salt Lake City, Mr. Linnell, manager of 
Bailey's Moving and Storage, told him to take the trailer to 
Utility Trailer and have it checked. Mr. Lee Wareham at Utility 
Trailer examined the trailer and told him repairs would cost 
approximately $600.00 and take four days to complete. Mr. Linnell 
did not authorize repairs at that time and told him they had a 
shipment that had to go and asked him if he knew of someone else 
who could look at it. (Abs. 21). 
-3-
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At plaintiff's suggestion and Mr. Linnell's consent (Abs. 24), 
plaintiff took the trailer to Slim Olson's where Mr. Dell Rees 
repaired the front torsion bar by shimming it (Abs. 21, 71-72). 
This work was done on May 22, 1968 (Abs. 72). After this work 
i 
was completed, the trailer was considerably quieter (Abs. 21) and 
plaintiff did not consider he had any problem with it after that 
time (Abs. 24). 
On August 1, 1968, three days before the accident on 
August 3, 1968, plaintiff signed as driver, the thirty-day 
inspection report made by Mr. Gilbert Wilburn, Baileyfs 
mechanic, which stated above his signature, "All defective 
items listed herein have been corrected." This report indicated 
that the tires, wheels and suspension system of both the tractor 
and trailer as being okay (Abs. 25). Also, the plaintiff, as 
driver, filled out daily inspection reports up to the time 
of the accident indicating that the tires and steering were 
okay, and until the accident occurred, he had no complaints 
regarding the running gear of either the tractor or trailer 
(Abs. 25). Even after the accident, he made no complaints to 
either Slim Olson or Bailey's of any defect in the tractor or 
trailer (Abs. 25). 
Plaintiff acknowledges that Mr. Rees told him the shimming 
job he did was a temporary repair and plaintiff expected to have 
further work done on the suspension system, but he drove a mini-
mum of 12,000 from the date the repair work was done to the date 
of the accident (Abs. 27). 
The accident in question occurred on an old narrow two-lane 
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highway at a point of substantial downgrade (Abs. 4) approximately 
one-tenth of a mile downhill from the crest of the hill (Abs. 3). 
The right duals went off the right side of the road and traveled 
approximately 225 feet before they came back on the blacktop 
where the rig veered across the road and off the left shoulder. 
The left shoulder of the road is a steep embankment and the rig 
was airborne for approximately forty-eight feet as it went off the 
left shoulder. The rig turned on its left side as it hit the 
ground and then skidded on its side for an additional ninety feet 
ten inches (Abs. 3 & Exh. 15). 
The maximum distance the right duals went off the right 
shoulder was four feet (Abs. 3). The left duals left no marks 
upon the blacktop during the time the right wheels traveled the 
225 feet off the blacktop on the right shoulder, but both the 
right and left duals left scuff marks on the highway as the rig 
came back across the road to the left as it crossed and went off 
the left shoulder (Exhs. 9 & 15). These marks indicated the 
brakes were not applied at the time they were made (Abs. 3). 
There were no tire marks on the roadway prior to the point where 
the right duals went off on the right shoulder (Exh. 15). 
Plaintiff's first notice of the accident was a feeling as 
though he had been rear ended by a car. He was thrown forward 
and the rig was jerked off the right side of the road. He 
glanced in the rear view mirror and saw the trailer coming behind 
him in a jackknifed position to his left (Abs. 22-23). 
The plaintiff's sons, Kendall who was nine years old at the 
-5-
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time of the accident, and Alan, who was fourteen years old at the 
time of the accident, both stated that the first thing they 
recalled about the accident was a loud bang. The next thing they 
both heard was the screeching of tires on the asphalt as the 
truck veered off the right side of the road (Abs. 13 & 15). 
However, both Kendall (Abs. 14) and Alan (Abs. 15) acknowledged 
that when their depositions were taken in December, 1971, they 
had not mentioned anything about a bang occurring prior to the 
rig going off the right hand side of the roadway. They both 
acknowledged that when their depositions were taken that they 
testified that at the time of the accident it felt like their 
trailer brakes had locked up (Abs. 14 & 16). Alan also testified 
that in discussions with his father at the hospital after the 
accident, his father told him that it seemed to him like the 
brakes had set up. His father never gave him any other explana-
tion as to the cause of the accident (Abs. 17). 
The accident was investigated by Officer Ritchie of the 
Wyoming Highway Patrol. His investigation consisted of inspect-
ing the vehicle, taking photographs and making measurements of 
the scene. From his measurements, he prepared Exhibit 15 (Abs. 
3). 
From his inspection of the vehicle, he did not remember 
seeing any blown tires or steering defects (Abs. 4). However, 
the estimate of repairs to plaintiff's tractor shows one tire 
with fifty percent wear requiring replacement (Exh. 48). 
Officer Ritchie did notice a fresh break in what he termed 
-6-
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a spring shackle (correctly designated a frame bracket) on the 
right rear tandem of the trailer. During the half an hour or 
longer while he was in the immediate area of the vehicle inspect-
ing and taking pictures, he did not notice anything unusual about 
the front or rear torsion bars running between the front and rear 
dual wheels (Abs. 5). Other than the broken shackle on the right 
rear of the trailer/ he did not observe anything else in the 
suspension system that appeared to be broken or out of place 
(Abs. 5). 
With respect to the duals, the back one was canted slightly 
to one side. He explained that the duals looked straighter in 
photograph 4-P than they did in 5-P and 4-P is the photograph 
looking down from the tractor toward the back of the trailer 
(Abs. 5-6). 
He made no attempt to take a photograph showing the fractured 
spring shackle (Abs. 6). 
After being recalled, Officer Ritchie stated that the two 
Dewsnup boys at the scene of the accident told him that they 
heard a loud noise and the truck jerked or lurched and their 
father started fighting the steering wheel to control the vehicle 
and it then went back across the road and over the embankment 
(Abs. 6). He also had a conversation with George Mason, the 
wrecker driver, who stated they would have to chain the rear 
axle ahead before they tipped it over. However, he was not with 
Mr. Mason when the latter righted the rig and brought it back to 
Casper (Abs. 7). 
-7-
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The trailer was righted and brought back to Casper, Wyoming 
by George Mason who owns Mason Wrecker Service. Mr. Mason came i 
to the scene with two rigs, a twin-boom wrecker and oil field 
wrecker, one of which was operated by his employee. They up-
righted the trailer without unloading it, brought it onto the < 
highway, turned it around and brought it back to Casper. They 
used the oil field tractor equipped with a fifth wheel, but due 
to the length of the unit, they were unable to lock the trailer { 
within the fifth wheel of the tractor and therefore secured it 
by a chain and winch line while they towed it back to Casper. 
They did not change any tires or do anything to the rear wheels 
of the trailer to make them tow properly. They experienced no 
difficulty in towing the trailer into Casper (Abs. 18-19). 
Mr. Mason stated he did not remember telling plaintiff's 
counsel in 1971 that one of the air sacs on the suspension system 
was collapsed nor did he at this time remember one of the sacs 
being collapsed (Abs. 19). 
The trailer was brought, back to Bailey!s yard at Ogden, Utah 
by Mr. Wilford Bingham. Mr. Bingham picked the trailer up at 
Masonfs lot in Casper, Wyoming. He put some bands around the 
front part of the trailer compartment (front end) where it had 
been broken open in the accident, but he made no repairs to the 
tires or suspension system. Mr. Mason said nothing to him about 
any chain on the suspension system and he did not see one. After 
he checked the tires, brakes, turn signals and stop lights, he 
pulled the trailer back to Ogden at speeds of approximately 50 
miles per hour without incident (Abs. 66). 
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The trailer was eventually brought to Utility Trailer's yard 
in Salt Lake City where it sat for approximately one and one-half 
years before it was repaired (Abs. 9). Utility Trailer purchased 
the trailer as salvage to rebuild and sell (Abs* 8). At the time 
repair work commenced, Mr. Robert Lee Wareham, the shop foreman, 
observed that one frame bracket had broken loose from where it had 
been welded to the frame, two of the four air bags were blown and 
it was blocked between the frame and the beams to hold the trailer 
up. Also# one axle was chained forward to make the trailer tow-
able (Abs. 8) . 
Mr. Wareham did not know how long the trailer had been sitting 
elsewhere before it was brought to Utility's yard or what may have 
happened to it before it got to Utility's yard (Abs. 9). He stated 
that the entire trailer, including the suspension system was re-
built by Utility Trailer after the accident. He assumed that the 
break in the frame bracket, as well as all of the other damage he 
observed, occurred in the accident. (Abs. 9). Mr. Wareham could 
not even estimate the year when Utility Trailer repaired the 
trailer because it has been seven years since he worked for Utility 
(Abs. 10). 
The frame bracket that was torn loose along the weld line 
was rewelded back to the frame. There was also other welding done 
such as welding breaks in the cross members of the trailer floor 
(Abs. 10). 
Both torsion bars were in place when Mr. Wareham inspected 
the undercarriage approximately a year and a half after the 
accident (Abs. 11). 
-9-
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The parts list for the repair work performed on the trailer 
after the accident indicated one tire was recapped, one tube was 
replaced, one torsion bar was replaced and one bushing was replaced. 
The total cost of repairing the trailer was $4,315.00. (Abs. 12). 
According to Mr. Wareham's best recollection, it was the left 
front frame bracket that was broken at the weld line (Abs. 12). 
A trailer was also worked on by Mr. Arnold Schmidt who was 
a working foreman on the night shift for Utility Trailer in 1967. 
He remembers seeing the trailer being brought into the yard by a 
wrecker, but he did not examine it at that time. He did not 
recall any kind of a chain around the suspension system and did 
not recall seeing a broken frame bracket when he worked on the 
trailer, but stated it may have been welded up by the day shift 
before he noticed it. (Abs. 59). He did notice one of the torsion 
bars not being properly in place. The bolt which holds the tor-
sion bar in place had a notch worn out where it fits through the 
slot into the torsion bar. At each end of both torsion bars, a 
steel plate had been welded on the beam and two of these plates 
were still in position, but one plate on the front bar and one 
plate on the rear bar were missing. The U bolts which hold the 
axle under the trailer on the beam were also twisted and replaced. 
(Abs. 58) . 
Mr. Schmidt did not know when the accident in question 
occurred, or what had been done with the trailer prior to the 
time it came into Utility's yard or prior to the time Utility 
commenced working on it. He had no way of identifying the trailer 
-10-
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in his memory other than it being a Bailey!s trailer. He had 
worked on other Bailey's trailers, but did not recall any others 
having as extensive damage. (Abs. 58-60). 
However, Mr. Schmidt recalled that the trailer he was talking 
about was worked on in about April, 1967. He started to work for 
Utility on February 1, 1967 and estimates that he started working 
on the trailer of which he was speaking in April, 1967, approximately 
two months after he was hired (Abs. 59-60). 
After being rebuilt by Utility Trailer, the trailer in ques-
tion was sold to Bender Moving Company of Reno, Nevada. Shortly 
before trial, the trailer was examined by Mr. Melvin Mullikin of 
Universal Testing Company who stated that his examination revealed 
that the left front frame bracket and some supporting members 
thereof had been welded to the frame more than once (Abs. 68). 
Plaintifffs expert, Mr. Lionel George Wildey, stated that, 
in his opinion, the accident in question was caused by a torsion 
bar coming part way out of one of the frame brackets which would 
transfer additional load to the opposite frame bracket and this 
overstressing might be sufficient to tear the opposite frame 
bracket from the chassis, which would then allow the whole axle 
to pivot and cause the trailer to push the tractor off the road 
(Abs. 34). Mr. Wildey stated that he had not examined the failed 
parts and the sum total of the evidence available to him upon 
which he based his theory of ground-induced steering was the 
photographs (Abs. 36). However, he acknowledged that he had 
carefully examined the photographs and that the best evidence 
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from the photographs is that the torsion bars were still in place 
after the accident (Abs. 36). Further, Mr. Wildey admitted that 
in arriving at his opinion, he had to make assumptions that are 
not demonstrated in the photographs (Tr. 274 (reference inadver-
tently omitted in abstract)). 
Mr. Wildey explained that the screeching sound heard by the 
Dewsnup boys at the beginning of the accident sequence was the 
misaligned duals being drug along the paved surface of the road-
way (Abs. 37), which action he would expect to leave scuff marks 
on the highway, but admitted there was no evidence of any such 
scuff marks (Abs. 39). 
Mr. Wildey also acknowledged that the only evidence he had 
of the misaligned axles which caused the ground-induced steering 
is the photographs, and that since one of the frame brackets had 
been sheared at the time the photographs were taken, there would 
be a sideways tension by gravity pull of the wheels and beams of 
the suspension system and that the axles would not be expected to 
be in perfect alignment as the trailer laid on its side when the 
photographs were taken. Mr. Wildey admitted that the photographs 
do not permit a determination of when the misalignment first took 
place, but explained "It's all we have got". (Abs. 38, Tr. 262). 
He admitted that it is possible that the frame bracket broke in 
the impact (Abs. 40). 
Mr. Wildey had never had occasion to examine an accident 
involving a similar type suspension system. He had not previously 
examined any trailers where a torsion bar had purportedly come 
-19-
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out and he has had no experience with the particular suspension 
system in question (Abs. 41). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OPINION OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS 
WAS BASED ON SPECULATION AND IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT 
The jury was instructed to return a Special Verdict in 
which the issue of defendant Bailey's Moving § Storage Company's 
liability was set out in interrogatories which submitted the 
issues of whether the accident was caused by a defect, was the 
defendant Bailey negligent, did defendant Bailey breach its 
agreement with plaintiff to inspect and maintain the trailer so 
that it was safe to operate with the tractor, and if the findings 
were in the affirmative, whether one or both of said issues 
were proximate causes of the accident. 
The primary question in this appeal is whether there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find there was a defect in 
the trailer which caused the accident. 
To establish the defect, plaintiff relied upon the testimony 
of an expert, Lionel George Wildey, who said that in his opinion 
the plaintiff lost control of the unit because of "ground 
induced steering" by the trailer, which would take charge of 
the tractor, forcing it off the road. He stated this resulted 
from a misalignment or malalignment of the trailer axles which, 
in his opinion, was caused by a torsion bar coming part-way out 
of one of the frame brackets. This transferred additional load 
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to the opposite frame bracket causing over-stress, which may 
have been sufficient to tear the opposite frame bracket from ( 
the trailer chassis, allowing the whole axle to pivot, causing 
the trailer to head toward the west (plaintifffs right) and 
push the tractor off the road to the east (plaintiff1s left) { 
(Abs. 34). Wildey had not examined the damaged parts, and he 
based his theory of "ground induced steering" solely on photo-
graphs of the rear dual wheels and tractor suspension system 
taken at the scene after the accident occurred (Abs, 36), He 
acknowledged that he had carefully examined the photos and that 
they showed the torsion bars were still in place after the 
accident (Abs. 36). Further, he admitted that in forming his 
opinion, he had to make assumptions that are not demonstrated 
in the photos. His testimony on cross-examination is quoted 
verbatim as follows: 
Q. Actually, Mr. Wildey, in looking at 
these photographs with the torsion bar i 
still in place as you look at the photographs, 
that fact alone tends to discount the theory that 
you have about how this accident occurred--
A. Well, we canft--
'i 
Q. Let me finish the question. You have to 
make assumptions that are not demonstrated in the 
photographs? 
A. That is true. 
Q. In other words, if you just took the photo-
graphic evidence alone, from what you can see of 
that suspension system, you would have to say that 
those torsion bars still appear to be in place? 
A. Or out of place and just resting. 
Q. Yes. And you can't see that they are out 
of place in the photographs? 
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A. There is no conclusive evidence in the 
photographs. I am using my experience in asses-
sing the self-induced -- the ground induced steering 
theory. 
Wildey's testimony on cross-examination was speculative 
as to which torsion bar came out of which frame bracket, causing 
the frame bracket on the opposite side to tear out. After 
repeated questions, he finally concluded that the torsion bar 
"drifted out from the right side." He said: 
Q. If it is one or the other, it seems to 
me it is a possibility. 
A. It is reasonable that it drifted out 
from the right side. 
Q. Well, is that the testimony that you 
want to say is the basis of your opinion? 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. I mean pick whichever one you want, but 
is this the one? 
A. Yes, I think so, yes. 
Q. And so then that breaks the left -- the 
left rear frame bracket? 
A. That could possibly break the left rear frame 
bracket and tear it loose at the frame. 
Q. Well, you keep telling me that it possibly 
could, so I guess it possibly couldn't. Is it 
your testimony that it did? 
A. Well, without examining the failed parts, 
I have to make a probability kind of a statement. 
Q. Well, as a practical matter, Mr. Wildey, 
isn't it true that you are basing your opinion 
on the fact that there is an apparent misalignment 
of the rear axles of this trailer that you have 
examined from the photographs? 
A. That is true. I am basing my whole 
theory on its ground induced steering. 
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Q. And the fact is you havenft really con-
sidered anything else other than merely looking 
at those photographs, have you? < 
A. That is the sum total of the available 
evidence that I can examine. (Tr. 252). 
Wildey qualified his theory that the torsion bar came out of 
the frame bracket by saying it was a "very strong possibility." 
He did not rule out that it could have worked vice versa (Tr. 
251) Officer Ritchie, who investigated the accident, observed 
the bracket (he termed it a spring shackle) on the right rear 
tandem axle of the trailer was broken, that the break appeared 
fresh, there was no rust in it (Abs. 4). Other than the
 i 
broken shackle on the right rear of the trailer, the officer 
did not observe anything else in the suspension system that 
appeared to be broken or out of place (Abs. 5). It is signi- , 
ficant that Wildey testified it was possible that the frame 
bracket was broken in the impact (Abs. 40). 
Wildey said that the "screeching sound" heard by the 
Dewsnup boys at the beginning of events in the accident sequence 
was caused by the misaligned dual wheels being dragged along 
the paved surface of the roadway (Abs. 37), which he would 
expect to leave scuff marks on the highway, but admitted that 
there was no evidence of any such scuff marks. He conceded 
that the photos do not permit a determination of when the 
misalignment first took place because the axles would not be 
expected to be in alignment as the trailer lay on its side 
after the frame bracket had been sheared. Referring to the 
photos, he said, "It's all we got" (Abs. 38, Tr. 262). 
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It is elementary that for the opinion of an expert wit-
ness to be admissible in evidence, a sufficient foundation 
must be laid to show that his conclusions are based upon 
evidence adduced in the case. In Day vs. Lorenzo Smith § Son, Inc., 
17 U.2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965), this Court, in reversing a 
judgment in favor of the defendant because the trial court 
erroneously permitted a highway patrolman to testify as to 
point of impact between two vehicles, said: 
An expert or skilled witness can give an 
opinion upon facts previously testified to by 
him, but not on facts known to him but not 
communicated to the jury. The witness must 
testify as to the facts upon which he bases his 
opinion and the facts should be related to the 
opinion. Otherwise, the testimony would be of 
little assistance to the court and jury, and 
there would be no way of testing the validity of 
the opinion. 
Opinion testimony, such as Sherwood's, is 
admissible only when the subject matter is such 
that a jury cannot be expected to draw correct 
inferences from the facts. There is no need for 
expert opinion with reference to facts involving 
commonplace occurrences. Expert testimony is 
not admissible solely because the witness has 
some skill in a particular field, but is admiss-
ible, if at all, only because the witness can 
offer assistance on a matter not within the 
knowledge or common experience of people of 
ordinary intelligence. 
Applying the foregoing principles to the 
instant case, we hold that it was error to 
permit Sherwood's testimony as to the point of 
impact because his opinion was not supported by 
sufficient facts and, what meager facts he did 
testify to were not connected up or related to 
his opinion. They were inadequate to support 
his conclusion. (Emphasis added) 
Wildey admitted that the photos taken of the trailer at the 
scene of the accident showed the torsion bars were in place 
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after the accident. Incidentally, this could also be observed 
by the lay jury. His theory that the torsion bars could have 
"drifted out" of the suspension assembly, caused the "ground 
induced steering" and then returned to position after the 
trailer came to rest is pure speculation. That the torsion 
bar or bars did not come partially out of the assembly to cause 
a misalignment of the axles is supported by the undisputed 
evidence that there were no scuff marks left by the left dual 
wheels on the asphalt surface of the roadway before the right 
dual wheels went off the hard surface onto the shoulder, or 
even after the right duals were off on the right shoulder and 
the left duals were traveling on the paved surface of the 
roadway. If the rear dual axle had pivoted, causing the 
driver to lose control as theorized by Wildey, considering the 
weight of the trailer, which was 2/3 loaded (Tr. 165), and had 
a capacity of 21,000 pounds (Tr. 169), there would have to be 
tire scuff marks left on the driving surface by the left 
dual wheel. According to Officer Ritchie's investigation, the 
unit traveled a distance of 225 feet partially off the roadway 
surface, with the right wheels on the shoulder and the left 
wheels on the surface, no scuff marks were left before the 
unit went onto the shoulder, or during the 225 feet the left 
wheels continued on the driving surface. The first scuff 
marks left by the wheels on both sides of the unit appeared at 
the point where the rig made the abrupt left turn across the 
highway and went off the left shoulder of the highway, travelin 
48 feet through the air before hitting the barrow pit where it Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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slid on its side another 90 feet 10 inches. Certainly, if the 
unit left scuff marks because of the abrupt left turn across 
the highway, the conclusion is inescapable that if the rear 
trailer axle had pivoted, causing misalignment of the dual 
wheels, it would not only cause friction marks on the roadway 
surface, but there would also be evidence of damage to the 
tires, neither of which was observed after the accident. 
Haarstrich vs. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70 U.552, 262 P. 100 
(1927), states the general principle that testimony contrary 
to uncontroverted physical facts does not constitute substantial 
evidence. If this rule is applicable to the testimony of a 
witness concerning an observed event, it should certainly 
apply to the opinion of an expert witness based upon the 
examination of photographs of a vehicle after the accident, 
which, in and of themselves, do not support his opinion. 
The legal principle is well established that the testimony 
of a witness on direct examination is no stronger than that 
elicited in cross-examination. Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 U.2d 
16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954); State vs. Pratt, 25 U.2d 76, 475 P.2d 
1013 (1970) . The following language from Alvarado is pertinent 
to the situation regarding the lack of evidence of a defect in 
the trailer: 
The burden was upon the plaintiff to prove 
the charge of speeding. Such a finding of fact 
could not be based upon mere speculation or con-
jecture, but only on a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 
It is well established that if the probabilities as to 
the cause of an accident are equally balanced betwppn tun n-r 
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more causes and defendant would be liable only under one set 
of fact, plaintiff has failed in his proof. The Utah Supreme \ 
Court in Perrin vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 59 Utah 
1, 201 P. 405 (1921) quoted with approval the following 
principle: ( 
If the probabilities are equally balanced that 
the accident was produced by a cause for which the 
defendant is responsible or by one for which he is 
not, the plaintiff must fail. Tremelling vs. Southern 
Pacific Company, 51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80, < 
which principle was reaffirmed in Alvarado vs. Tucker, 
supra. In discussing plaintiff's obligation to prove a 
particular fact by a "preponderance of the evidence" the ' 
Court stated: 
A choice of probabilities does not meet this 
requirement. It creates only a basis for conjec-
ture, on which a verdict of the jury cannot stand. 
In the case at bar, it is clear in considering 
Wildey's testimony in its entirety, as it must be 
considered, Alvarado vs. Tucker, supra, that his opinion is 
based merely on the possibility that a torsion bar might have 
drifted out of the frame bracket on one side of the suspension 
system causing the frame bracket on the other side to break. 
He acknowledged that his only evidence of the torsion bar 
being out is the photographs, but that in the photographs "it 
looks as though it is still in place" and that to support his 
opinion, one has "to make assumptions that are not demonstrated 
in the photographs." 
Further, he acknowledges that the misalighment of the 
axles shown in the photographs are as consistent with the 
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frame bracket having been "broken in the impact" (a circumstance 
for which defendants would not be liable) as that the broken 
bracket was the cause of the accident. Such being the case, 
the jury could not have found from a "preponderance of the 
evidence" whether the frame bracket broke and caused the accident, 
or was broken in the accident. They would have had to speculate 
to arrive at either conclusion, and such speculation is not 
sufficient to sustain a verdict. See Denny v. St. Mark's Hospital, 
21 U.2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968) where plaintiff claimed an 
x-ray technician had injured her neck in positioning her for 
x-rays and plaintiff's expert, Dr. Hebertsen, testified such 
positioning could have injured plaintiff's neck, but his opinion 
was not otherwise supported in the evidence. In affirming a 
directed verdict for defendant, this Court stated: 
Such testimony is not sufficient to enable a 
jury to do more than speculate as to what was 
the cause of plaintiff's troubles. 
In the case of Price vs. Ashby's Incorporated, 11 U.2d 54, 
354 P.2d 1064 (1960), plaintiff's evidence went further than 
in the present case and did show a defect to exist in plaintiff's 
automobile which failed to negotiate a curve, but did not 
establish that the alleged defect was the proximate cause of 
the accident. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of 
the action, at the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the 
Court observed: 
The highway where the car left the road was 
in all respects normal and was a smooth oiled 
surface. The car could have left the road for 
any one or more of a number of reasons. For example, 
a driver could have been momentarily dozing or could 
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There is no evidence here that the driver ever 
attempted to turn the steering wheel to cause the 
car to go to the left with the road. With two or 
more possible causes such as an inattentive driver 
and a mechanical defect that would have made it 
harder to turn; proof that it may have been either 
is not proof that it was in fact either. No evidence 
indicated that either cause was the more probable. 
(Emphasis added). 
Also, re Beardall vs. Murray, 27 U.2d 340, 496 P.2d 260 
(1972), where this Court affirmed the trial court's refusal 
to admit the testimony of an expert whose opinion was based 
on factors not shown in the evidence to be present. The 
Court said: 
. . . He arrived at his conclusion by use of 
a formula relating to the physics of a hypothetical 
case, based on weights, speeds of vehicles, angles 
of travel, etc. which were not shown to be connected 
with Those extant here. Under such circumstances 
we cannot conclude that the court erred, as claimed 
on appeal in sustaining an objection to the introduc-
tion of such testimony, - and we so hold. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'ERRED IN PERMITTING WITNESS RITCHIE 
TO IMPEACH THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS MASON 
WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION HAVING BEEN LAID 
The testimony of witness George Mason was introduced by 
way of deposition. In the direct examination of Mason, he was 
asked the following question and answered as indicated: 
Q. And when you then towed it in, did you have 
to do anything to the rear wheels of the trailer 
to make them tow properly? 
A. The best I can remember, no. 
On cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel, no further ques-
tions were asked of Mason regarding the rear wheels of the 
trailer. 
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However, in the direct examination of witness Ritchie by 
plaintiff1s counsel, the Court permitted, over defendant's 
objection, Ritchie to testify that Mason told him in substance: 
I'll have to chain (expletive) up before I can move it (Abs. 
7, Tr. 131-133). 
It was error to permit Mr. Ritchie to impeach the testi-
mony of Mason without having first asked Mason about the 
statement in question. As stated by Justice Wolfe in Jensen 
vs. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708 (1936): 
Even where a witness states he does not remem-
ber any conversation with the proposed impeaching 
witness, that part of the alleged conversation 
which it is claimed would impeach him should be 
called to his attention, for it may yet serve to 
refresh his memory and give him the required 
opportunity to deny it specifically, or, if 
admitting to it, to qualify or explain it or 
testify as he thinks it actually took place.n 
Permitting Ritchie to so testify was extremely prejudicial to 
defendant's case since it gave plaintiff an opportunity to impeach 
one of defendant's important witnesses on a significant point 
without giving said witness an opportunity to deny or explain the 
statement in question. 
The witness, Wilford Bingham, was sent to Casper, Wyoming, by 
the defendant to bring the damaged trailer back to Utah. He inspected 
the trailer, placed steel bands around the front of the trailer 
compartment to secure it. There were no chains on the rear sus-
pension system. Before pulling the trailer on the return trip to 
Salt Lake City, he checked the tires and brakes and made no alter-
ation of any kind to the suspension system. He towed the trailer 
on the return trip. He experienced no problem with towing the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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trailer at a speed of approximately 50 miles per hour (Abs. 56), 
and noticed nothing unusual about the trailer while bringing it < 
back (Abs. 67). 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE TWO TIRES WHICH < 
HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE TRAILER PRIOR TO THE AXLES 
BEING SHIMMED WHICH WERE NOT INDICATIVE OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE SUSPENSION SYSTEM AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT 
The Court admitted into evidence over defendant's objection ( 
plaintiff's Exhibits 22 and 23, which were two tires which had been 
on the trailer in question before the trailer was taken to 
Slim Olson's Service Station for shimming and were not on the { 
trailer after the shimming work had been done, or at the time 
of the accident. The tires had large cups on their circumference 
showing uneven wear. The plaintiff testified that he did not j 
remember whether they came off the right or left side or off 
the front or rear axles, but only that they were two of the 
tires which had been on the trailer when he experienced the 
rattling noise before the temporary repairs were made at Slim 
Olson's. 
The plaintiff further testified that the two tires in 
question were taken off in the spring of 1968. The accident 
occurred in August, 1968. He testified that Slim Olson shimmed 
the torsion bars in May or June of 1968 and that the rattle 
was considerably quieter after the shimming (Abs. 21, 22). 
Thus, it is evidence that the condition of the torsion bars 
had been altered since the excessive cupping wear to the tires 
had taken place, and the condition of the tires was not probative 
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of any condition that existed at the time of the accident. 
Further, since plaintiff could not testify what wheels or even 
what axles the tires had come off from, and since Mr. Wildey's 
opinion was that the rear axle was the one which was misaligned 
and caused the accident, there was no foundation to support 
admission of the tires into evidence. 
Since the tires showed excessive wear which may have been 
indicative of misalignment of the axle or wheels on which they 
were mounted and thus an indication of faulty maintenance by 
this defendant, admitting them into evidence was highly prejudicial 
to this defendant. They were large graphic exhibits and 
undoubtedly influenced the jury as they stood before them 
during several days of trial. Defendant was subjected to all 
of the unfavorable inferences which might be drawn from the 
appearance of these tires when it had not been established 
whether they were on the front or rear axle. If they had been 
on the front axle, the condition of the axle had been changed 
prior to the accident, and, accordingly, the tires had nothing 
to do with the accident and were not indicative of any condition 
that existed at the time of the accident. 
Even assuming that the tires gave an inference that this 
defendant was negligent at some date prior to the accident, it 
is elementary that prior negligence is not admissible to show 
negligence on the date of the incident in question, especially 
when there has been a change in the circumstances involving 
the evidence purporting to show such prior negligence. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF GENERAL DAMAGES IN 
EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT PRAYED FOR IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
The general law with respect to recovering damages great-
er than the amount plead is discussed in 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages, 
Section 276, page 371, where it is stated: 
While in the averments of damages it is not 
necessary to be exact and the plaintiff's right of 
action is not affected by the fact that he is 
unable to sustain the allegation as to the amount ( 
of damages or unable to prove damages in the amount 
alleged, it is essential that the sum stated in the 
conclusion be sufficient to cover the amount of 
plaintiff's real demand, for in general the complain-
ant cannot recover greater damages than the amount, 
with interest, he has declared for and demanded in { 
his pleadings, nor may the award include amounts 
not embraced within the averments of the complaint. 
As a general rule, though, amendments which merely 
increase the amount of damages claimed to have 
arisen from the cause of action originally stated 
in the pleadings may be allowed even as late as the < 
time of trial. 
There is no statute nor case law in the State of Utah indicating 
or holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in 
excess of that which is set forth in the pleadings. Rule 
54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against
 i 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party 
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if 
the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings. 
This rule is similar to Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The construction of Rule 54(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is discussed in 6 Moore's 
Federal Practice, pages 1261 through 1271. It is easily 
understood from the reading of this treatise that the liberal 
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approach to granting the relief a party is entitled to even 
if such relief is not contained in the pleadings focuses on 
the type of relief and not the amount. This is clearly 
indicated in the following statement. 
If a party is entitled to any relief under the 
facts as established by the pleadings or proof, 
the claim will not be dismissed simply because 
complainant has erred as to legal theory and is 
not entitled to the relief prayed for. An amendment 
to the prayer is not necessary to obtain the 
substantive relief to which the claimant is entitled; 
but is usually necessary if the claimant seeks to 
change an equitable claim into a legal claim, or 
vise versa, for the purpose of obtaining a jury or 
court trial. 
While appropriate relief should be granted, 
this does not include relief as to a matter not 
made out in the pleadings or proof; and ordinarily, 
relief which neither party desires should not be 
forced on them. 6 Moore's Federal Practice, pages 
1264 through 1266. (Emphasis added.) 
Many of our sister states hold that a verdict in excess 
of that demanded in the complaint is erroneous. In Smith vs. Tang, 
100 Arizona 196, 412 P.2d 697 (1966), an action by a decedent!s 
spouse against the estate for the recovery of certain funds 
claimed to be owed here, the Court stated the following: 
The general law with respect to a verdict for 
more than the allegation of a complaint demand is 
that the verdict is erroneous. 89 CJS Trial Section 
506. As stated in 65 A.L.R.2d 1331: 
"In the majority of cases where a verdict or 
judgment entered upon such verdict was deemed 
erroneous because exceeding amount of damages 
claimed or demanded in the successful party's 
pleadings, it has been held that a new trial 
may be avoided by a remittur of the amount of 
the excess." 
In Bliss vs. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County, 
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condemnation award, in refusing to allow a judgment for damages 
greater than that for which it was plead, the Court stated: 
The authorities seem to bear out the contention. 
Thus it is said in 23 Cyc. 795, 796: 
"It is a general rule that a judgment 
cannot properly be rendered for a greater sum, 
whether by way of debt or damages, than is 
claimed or demanded by plaintiff in his declara-
tion or complaint. And it is immaterial that 
the evidence may prove a greater debt or a 
greater amount of damage than was alleged by 
plaintiff." 
Numerous cases as cited. In 25 CJS, Damages, 
Section 143, page 787, it is stated that: 
"Plaintiff is precluded from recovering 
but not from proving, a greater sum than that 
alleged in the petition or complaint." 
In 15 Am.Jur., Section 309, page 751, we find it 
said that: 
"In general the plaintiff cannot recover 
greater damages than he has declared for and 
demanded in his declaration, complaint or 
petition." 
41 Am.Jur., Section 112, page 368 states: 
"But relief will not be granted beyond the fair 
scope of the plaintiff's allegation and 
prayer." 
In the case of Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co. vs. 
Blackburn, 188 Kentucky 456, 222 S.W. 99, the Court held that 
where petition itemizes the amounts of the various damages, 
recovery is limited to the amount specified, notwithstanding 
that the evidence might show greater damage. 
In Strahm vs. Murry, 199 P.2d 603 (Okla. 1948), the 
Court held in a property damage case that: 
A judgment for damages in an amount greater 
than that sought in the complaint cannot be 
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Also, in Olwell vs. Nye and Nissen Company, 173 P.2d 
652 (Wash, 1947), the Court stated: 
It is said by Sutherland, in his work on 
damages, (Section 415), that: * 
"The controlling part of the complaint 
as to the amount of damages is the prayer 
for judgment." 
And in Sedg. Meas. Dam. (8th Ed. Section 
1260) it is said: 
" . . . except as fixing a limit beyond 
which recovery cannot be had, the averment 
of the amount of damages is not a material 
one. 
In regard to the amount of damages to 
be avered, it is only necessary to lay 
them so high as to cover the injury: for 
no recovery can be had beyond the amount 
in the declaration." 3 Sedgwick on Damages, 
9th Ed., 2590, Section 1258. 
From the foregoing authorities, it is apparent 
that the general law adhered to by most states is 
that a party cannot recover damages in excess of 
that which they have plead in their complaint, although the 
Federal Courts are admittedly more liberal in this regard. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adhered to the majority rule 
which allows the successful party to accept remittitur 
rather than requiring a new trial. In Adair vs. James M. Peterson Ban 
61 Utah 159, 211 P. 683 (1922), the Supreme Court of Utah 
affirmed the general rule by holding that the plaintiff's 
acceptance of remittitur would obviate the need for a new 
trial since the verdict had been returned in excess of the 
amount prayed for in the complaint. The Court said: 
-?Q-
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In passing on the motion for a new trial the 
Court should have required respondent to remit 
the Twenty Dollars ($20.00) from the amount of 
the judgment and, in case he refused to do so, 
to have granted a new trial. Foulger vs. McGrath, 
34 Utah 86, 95 P. 1004. It is therefore ordered " 
that, in case the respondent shall file with 
the Clerk of this Court, within twenty (20) 
days after notice of this decision, his consent 
to remit the sum of Twenty Dollars ($20.00) as 
of the date the judgment was entered, the 
judgment will stand affirmed, each party to pay 
his own costs on appeal; otherwise, the judgment 
is reversed, and a new trial granted, in which 
event appellant shall recover its costs on 
appeal. Id 61 Utah at 164. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also adopted the general rule 
in principle as shown by its Jury Instruction Forms of Utah, 
compiled and edited by members of the Supreme Court seven 
years after the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Preface to this work commences: 
The purpose of this is to provide a set of 
patterns for jury instructions which may be looked 
upon with some degree of assurance as to their 
accuracy under the laws of Utah. . . 
Section 90.1 of JIFU suggests that an appropriate conclud 
paragraph regarding the assessment of damages be: 
The amount of damages thus assessed (for 
all of the foregoing) must not exceed the sum 
of $" ^  , the amount the plaintiff prays for 
in (his) complaintT [Emphasis added.) 
In addition to the legal authorities cited above, there 
are significant policy reasons for enforcing the rule that a 
party is limited to the amount of damages prayed for in his 
complaint. The prayer for damages set forth in plaintiff's 
complaint must establish the parameters in which the parties 
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evaluate the extent of one's injury or damage than the person 
who has been so injured or damaged. In addition, the amount 
claimed in a complaint in many circumstances is jurisdictional 
in nature and is so significant that unless certain requirements 
are met with respect to the jurisdictional amount, a party 
cannot proceed. Although that is not the point in consideration 
in the instant case, it does point up the significance and 
importance of the ad damnum clause. 
One of the most significant problems in tort litigation 
relative to the ad damnum clause is that it is the prayer of 
the complaint which determines whether or not the defendant 
has complete insurance coverage for the alleged loss, or 
whether he has an exposure over the policy limits for which he 
should retain counsel to represent and protect. To permit 
recovery in excess of the prayer of a complaint would make it 
impossible for an insurance company to accurately fulfill its 
obligation to its insured to advise him at the commencement of 
litigation whether or not he has a personal exposure. To in 
all cases advise that a verdict could be rendered in excess of 
the prayer of the complaint would cause many concerned persons 
to incur the expense of retaining personal counsel when there 
was no actual reason for them to do so in order to be fully 
protected against the exceptional circumstances when it might 
be necessary or desirable to have retained personal counsel. 
In effect, if a verdict in excess of the prayer of the complaint 
is permitted to stand, the defendant is deprived of notice of 
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denied the procedural notice safeguard necessary to due 
process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
An expert witness, in expressing an opinion, may not 
assume facts not in evidence. Such an opinion would be ,fpulling 
itself up by its own boot straps." Wildey's opinion that a 
torsion bar had drifted out and allowed the rear axle to move 
i 
back, causing misalignment and ground induced steering of the 
trailer, forcing the tractor off the road, was based solely 
upon the photographs, which he acknowledged, seem to show the 
torsion bar in place, and further admitted that his opinion 
was based on assumptions not shown by the photographs. Thus, 
it is clear that his opinion was based upon conjecture from , 
which the jury could not find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that a defect caused the accident. He acknowledged 
that it was possible that the broken frame bracket could have i 
been the result of, as well as a cause of the accident. Where 
there are two plausible explanations for the existence of a 
fact, for which the defendant could be responsible for only 
one cause, plaintiff has not met his burden of proof, and in 
order to return a verdict, a jury would have to speculate as to which 
explanation was correct. 
Substantial prejudicial error was committed in allowing 
plaintiff to impeach the testimony of its witness Mason by 
plaintiff1s witness Ritchie, when no foundation had been laid 
by affording Mason an opportunity to affirm, or even remember 
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the impeaching statement. Likewise, the admission into evidence, 
over defendants objection, of two tires showing extensive 
"cupping" wear which had been on the trailer prior to the 
change in condition of the forward axle effected by the repairs 
made by Slim Olson, which, by admission of the plaintiff's 
expert, had nothing to do with the accident, greatly prejudiced 
defendant's position. 
Further, the Trial Court erroneously awarded judgment in 
excess of the prayer of the complaint. 
WHEREFORE, defendant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company 
prays that the judgments awarded against it be reversed, or, 
in the alternative, that defendant be awarded a new trial, or, 
in the further alternative, that defendant be awarded remititur 
of $50,000 on the general damages award. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, WADSWORTH § RUSSON 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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